Crepe House vs Papa Murphy's

Crepe House is a non-starter. Four total units, zero franchised, and a franchisor-controlled procurement model mean there’s no addressable market to sell into and no autonomy at the store level to buy software independently. Even if the $1.09M AUV looks healthy for a young concept, the total available market is microscopic. You’d be betting on a founder’s willingness to mandate a tech stack across a handful of corporate stores—that’s a consulting gig, not a scalable sales motion.

Papa Murphy’s gives you a real TAM with 965 franchised locations and an approved-supplier procurement model that lets franchisees actually choose their own tools. The -3.6% unit contraction is a warning sign, not a dealbreaker: it means churn is real, but it also means surviving operators are under pressure to drive efficiency, which is exactly when POS, scheduling, and marketing automation become must-buy, not nice-to-have. The $450K–$693K investment range signals operators with enough skin in the game to spend on software that protects margins, and the 5% royalty leaves slightly more room for tech budget than concepts bleeding franchisees at 6%–8%.

The tradeoff is terrain versus TAM. Crepe House has zero terrain friction because there’s no existing tech stack to displace, but also no buyers. Papa Murphy’s has 965 doors where you’ll fight incumbents and franchisee inertia, but the procurement model gives you a fair shot, and the shrinking footprint creates urgency. In B2B franchise sales, an open buying process across a large, motivated base beats a closed door at a concept that doesn’t exist yet.

Verdict: Papa Murphy’s is the only rational target—large TAM, open procurement, and churn-driven demand outweigh negative unit growth.